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Abstract
Two countries produce goods and are penalized by the common pol-
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lution they generate. Each country maximizes an inter-temporal utility
criterion, taking account of the pollution stock to which both contribute.
The dynamic is in continuous time with possible sudden switches to less
polluting technologies. The set of Nash equilibria, for which solutions also
remain in the set of constraints, is the intersection of two manifolds in a
certain state space. At the Nash equilibrium, the choices of the two coun-
tries are interdependent: different productivity levels after switching lead
the more productive country to hasten and the less productive to delay the
switch. In the absence of cooperation, efforts by one country to pollute less
motivate the other to pollute more, or encourage the country that will be
cleaner or less productive country after switching to delay its transition.
Key words: Pollution, dynamic game, Nash, viability theory.
AMS classification: 49M30, 49K30, 91B06, 91B5
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1 Introduction
The economics of the commons (Hardin, 1968, 1994, 2008) with two non-
cooperating countries sharing a common pollution may lead to Nash equilibria.
The complexity of the dynamic usually makes it hard to find an analytic solution,
and this holds even more so when trajectories have to remain within constraints
and when the continuous dynamic can be reset by impulses on state variables.
Taking the production function linear in input and the input as a control
variable, Boucekkine, Krawczyck, and Valle´e (2011) proved the existence of a
Nash equilibrium, where each player chooses the technology without regard for
the other’s choice. Here, we consider a Cobb-Douglas production function and
the input as a state variable governed by a differential equation. This precludes
finding analytic solutions, but we can deal with non-linearities and with the
switching times from the more to the less polluting regime. Our solution is
numerical and the procedure can be used whenever looking for Nash equilibria
between two rivals.
Our solution to the problem of the commons innovates by exploiting the prop-
erties of capture-viability kernels. The capture-viability kernel of a closed set K
with closed target Ω under a set-valued dynamic F is the set of all initial states
from which there exists at least one solution remaining in K and reaching Ω at
a given time horizon, possibly infinite. Such initial states are called viable. Our
innovation is to show that a state is a viable Nash equilibrium if and only if it
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is located at the intersection of certain boundaries of two capture-viability ker-
nels. Fulton (1997), Sarkar, Gupta, and Pal (1998), and Agata (2010) proposed
geometric solutions of Cournot oligopoly, but not in the framework of optimal
control.
The solution by capture-viability kernels yields all valuation functions without
solving the first-order Pontryagin necessary conditions for each set of initial con-
ditions, without even solving any differential equation (Bonneuil and Boucekkine,
2014, 2016). State constraints are inherently taken into account, while they must
be treated one by one in Pontryagin’s or Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman’s methods,
with the additional requirement to verify sufficient conditions, in the sense of
Arrow’s theorem (Kamien and Schwartz, 1991).
In dynamic programming, functional relationships often have to be assumed
in order to derive the optimal feedback rules. This kind of assumption is not
necessary here, which opens the way to searching for possible a posteriori rela-
tionships between controls and state variables at Nash equilibria, as well as a
posteriori dependence between the two players.
We show that different productivity levels after the switch to a cleaner tech-
nology gives the more productive country a lead in the valuation function: this
country hastens, and the less productive country delays, making the switch.
We reveal the non-corner solutions of the game: at Nash equilibrium, the play-
ers are not assumed to be selfish as in Boucekkine, Krawczyck, and Valle´e (2011).
Our consideration of non-linearities, through the Cobb-Douglas production func-
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tions, enriches the problem and leads to a more differentiated set of equilibria.
The problem has infinite time horizon support. We solve it by finite time hori-
zon approximation, which Bonneuil (2012) proved to be convergent. Because we
deal with non-linearities, our solution, based on Bonneuil (2006)’s algorithm, is
numerical.
After presenting the problem of common pollution (section 2) and viability
theory (section 3.1), we explain how to infer Nash equilibria from capture-viability
kernels (section 3.2). Numerical solving is achieved with the viability algorithm
(section 4.1), which we use to consider three exemplary cases (section 4.2): same
response from each country in terms of productivity and reducing pollution to
the introduction of a cleaner technology; same productivity but different levels
of pollution reduction, and different productivity levels with similar effect on
pollution. We determine the Nash equilibria (section 4.3).
2 The problem
Two non-cooperating countries called 1 and 2 produce goods, generating a
pollution equally detrimental to both countries. They do not trade in goods. Each
country j = 1, 2 has consumption C(j) and capital K(j), with common capital
share ν in the production function A(j)(K(j))ν . It uses a technology with progress
level A(j) and marginal contribution to pollution α(j). It has the possibility, at
a date t(j) that it chooses, to switch from a technology characterized by A(j) =
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A
(j)
1 and α
(j) = α
(j)
1 to a less polluting technology characterized by A
(j)
2 and
marginal contribution to pollution α
(j)
2 . Pollution comes from both countries and
is proportional to production.
Country j = 1, 2 solves the program:
max
C(j),t(j)
∫ ∞
0
U(C(j)(t), P (t))e−ρt dt, (1)
where U is the utility function and ρ the discount rate, under the continuous-time
dynamic:
K(j)
′
(t) = A(j)(t)(K(j)(t))ν − C(j)(t)− δKK(j)(t)
P ′(t) =
∑2
i=1 α
(i)(t)A(i)(t)(K(i)(t))ν − δPP (t)
A(j)
′
(t) = 0
α(j)
′
(t) = 0
A(j)(0) = A
(j)
1 , α
(j)(0) = α
(j)
1 , K
(j)(0) = K
(j)
0 , P (0) = P0, j = 1, 2,
(2)
and the impulse (or discrete-time part) at t(j), j = 1, 2:
K(j)
+
= K(j)
−
P+ = P−
A(j)
+
= A(j)
−
+ A
(j)
2 − A(j)1
α(j)
+
= α(j)
−
+ α
(j)
2 − α(j)1 , j = 1, 2.
(3)
We use the conventional utility function (Boucekkine et al., 2011):
U (j)(C,P ) = ln(C)− β(j)P, (4)
where β(j) is a country-specific parameter, j = 1, 2. The controls are t(1), t(2),
C(1), and C(2), and the state variables K(1), K(2), P , A(1), A(2), α(1), and α(2).
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System {2, 3} constitutes a differential system in continuous-discrete time,
also called hybrid dynamic (Bensoussan and Menaldi, 1997) under the constraints
K := {K(1) ≥ K(1)min, K(2) ≥ K(2)min, P ≥ 0, A(1) ≥ A(1)min, A(2) ≥ A(2)min, α(1) ≥ α(1)min,
α(2) ≥ α(2)min} = R+7.
(5)
Nash equilibria are obtained when country 1 maximizes its inter-temporal
utility, that is, solves (1) with j = 1, considering that country 2 does the same,
that is, solves (1) with j = 2.
3 Method: Capture-Viability, Optimization, Al-
gorithm
3.1 Impulse Dynamical Systems and Capture-Viability
An impulse differential inclusion (F,R) consists in a continuous-time set-
valued map F : X → X:
x′ ∈ F (x) = {f(x, u, v), u ∈ Vu(x), v ∈ Vv(x)}, (6)
where f is a function such that F satisfies the regularity properties (3.1) stated
below and Vu(x) and Vv(x) are closed sets, and a discrete-time reset map R :
X → X, giving a successor state
xi+1 ∈ R(xi) (7)
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to the state xi at control impulse time ti.
For K ⊂ Rm a closed set, the problem of capture-viability is to delineate all
states x0 ∈ K from which there exists at least one trajectory under the dynamic
(F,R) remaining in K until a given time horizon T and hitting a closed subset
Ω ⊂ K in finite time. Such states are said to be viable in K under (F,R) with
target Ω. Aubin (1991) states that, when the Marchaud assumptions:
Hypothesis 3.1.
(i) F is upper semi-continuous with non empty compact, convex values,
(ii) ∃ c ∈ R such that supy∈F (x) ‖ y ‖< c(‖ x ‖ +1),
(iii) R is upper semi-continuous with compact domain and compact values
(8)
hold true, then there exists a maximal set of viable states —called capture-viability
kernel— containing all sets of viable states. The hybrid capture-viability kernel
of K under the hybrid dynamic (F,R) is denoted Viab(F,R)(K,Ω).
SF (x0, v(·)) is the set of absolutely continuous solutions to (6) starting from
x0, and for any subset X of Rm, SF (X, v(·)) :=
⋃
x0∈X SF (x0, v(·)). The scalar
product is denoted by < , >.
Definition 3.2. Consider set-valued maps F : Rm 7→ Rm and R : Rm 7→ Rm
satisfying Assumptions 3.1.
• For a continuous-time system described by the differential inclusion x′ ∈
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F (x), K is a viability domain with target Ω under F if and only if
∀x ∈ K \ Ω, ∀y ∈ NPK(x), ∃y ∈ F (x), < y, y >≤ 0 , (9)
where NPK(x) is the normal cone to K in x. If K is not a viability domain
with target, there exists a largest closed capture-viability domain contained
in K denoted by CaptF (K,Ω) and called the capture-viability kernel of K
with target Ω. It is the largest closed set of initial conditions in K from
which there exists at least one trajectory viable in K with target Ω.
• For an impulse system (F,R), K is an impulse capture-viability domain
with target Ω under (F,R) if and only if it is a viability domain with target
(Ω ∪R−1(K ∪ Ω)) under F , namely
∀x ∈ K\(Ω∪R−1(K∪Ω)), ∀y ∈ NPK(x), ∃y ∈ F (x), < y, y >≤ 0. (10)
If K is not an impulse capture-viability domain with target, there exists a
largest closed impulse capture-viability domain contained in K, called im-
pulse capture-viability kernel ofK with target Ω and denoted Capt(F,R)(K,Ω).
It is the set of initial conditions in K from which there exists at least one
trajectory of (F,R) viable in K with target Ω.
Quincampoix and Veliov (1998) proved the first point, Saint-Pierre (2002) the
second point.
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3.2 Viable Nash equilibria by capture-viability kernels
The problem {2, 3} is a problem of capture-viability with impulse. It can be
written as a differential inclusion with impulse:
x′(t) ∈ F (x(t)) := {(A(1)(t)(K(1)(t))ν − C(1)(t)− δKK(1)(t),
A(2)(t)(K(2)(t))ν − C(2)(t)− δKK(2)(t),∑2
i=1 α
(i)(t)A(i)(t)(K(i)(t))ν − δPP (t), 0, 0, 0, 0
)
| C(1) ∈ V (1), C(2) ∈ V (2), t(1) ≥ 0, t(2) ≥ 0}
x+ = R(x−) := {K(1)−, K(2)−, P−, A(1)− + A(1)2 − A(1)1 , A(2)−,
α(1)
−
+ α
(1)
2 − α(1)1 , α(2)−} at t(1),
x+ = R(x−) := {K(1)−, K(2)−, P−, A(1)−, A(2)− + A(2)2 − A(2)1 ,
α(1)
−
, α(2)
−
+ α
(2)
2 − α(2)1 } at t(2),
(11)
where x := (K(1), K(2), P, A(1), A(2), α(1), α(2)), and where V (j) ⊂ R+, j = 1, 2, are
closed sets, under the state constraints defined by K (defined in (5)).
Moreover, Bonneuil (2012) showed that x0 ∈ Rn is a solution to the optimiza-
tion problem 
maxu∈Vu
∫∞
0
L(x(t)) dt
x′(t) ∈ F (x(t)) := {f(x(t), u(t)) | u(t) ∈ Vu}
x+ = R(x−) at t(1), · · · , t(n)
∀t, x(t) ∈ K
x(0) = x0,
(12)
where t(1), · · · , t(n) are discrete times, if and only if it is located on the upper
boundary in the direction of high y of the capture-viability kernel Capt(F,R,−L)(K×
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R,K × {0}) for the augmented dynamic
x′(t) ∈ F (x(t))
x+ = R(x−) at t(1), · · · , t(n)
y′(t) = −L(x(t))
∀t, x(t) ∈ K
x(0) = x0
y(0) = y0.
(13)
Bonneuil (2012) also showed that the infinite time problem (T = ∞) is con-
veniently approximated by T < ∞ large enough, which is made possible by the
discount term exp(−ρt). The numerical results below correspond to T = 30 and
ρ = 5%. We present the method for the approximation of (1) in finite time
horizon T . The criterion becomes
max
C(j),t(j)
∫ T
0
U(C(j)(t), P (t))e−ρt dt. (14)
By increasing the time horizon T to infinity, the solution of problem (14)
converges to problem (1).
Proposition 3.3. The valuation function in the infinitesimal horizon control
problem:
max
C(j),t(j)
∫ ∞
0
U(C(j)(t), P (t))e−ρt dt, j = 1, 2, (15)
with (C(1)(0), C(2)(0), P (0)) = (C
(1)
0 , C
(2)
0 , P0), is related to the capture-viability
kernel
Capt
(∞)
(F,R,−L)(K × R+, K × {0}) :=
⋃
T≥0
Capt
(T )
(F,R,−L)(K × R+, K × {0}) (16)
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by:
∞
V
sup
(x) = sup
(x,y)∈Capt(F,R,−L)(K×IR+,K×{0})
y (17)
Proof: in Bonneuil (2012).
On this basis, we now innovate by finding all the Nash equilibria of {1, 2, 3}.
We do this by solving the two optimization programs (14) jointly, with valuation
functions y(1) and y(2). The idea is first to identify viable states in K× [0, T ]×R2
with target K × {T, 0, 0} under the dynamic {2, 3} augmented with the three
differential equations:
t′ = 1
y(j)
′
(t) := −U(C(j)(t), P (t))e−ρt, j = 1, 2,
(18)
with initial conditions
x(0) = x0, t(0) = 0; y
(1)(0) = y
(1)
0 , y
(2)(0) = y
(2)
0 . (19)
This is achieved by Bonneuil (2006)’s viability algorithm applied to identify viable
states belonging to Capt{2,3,18}(K×R3,K×{T, 0, 0}) of the augmented dynamic.
This is performed in the ten-dimensional state space (K(1), K(2), P , A(1), A(2),
α(1), α(2), t, y(1), y(2)) with the four controls t(1), t(2), C(1), C(2). However, the
initial conditions of t, A(j), and α(j) are fixed, so there remain five dimensions in
which to search for viable states.
The boundary in the direction of high y(1) of Capt{2,3,18}(K×R3,K×{T, 0, 0}).
gathers all initial conditions from which there exists a trajectory satisfying all
state constraints and such that y(1)(0) is maximal, considering the variables taken
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by country 2 as given. The same is true for the boundary in the direction of high
y(2), such that y(2)(0) is maximal, considering the values of the variables taken
by country 1 as given. The set of Nash viable equilibria, where each country
maximizes its valuation function taking into account that the other country also
maximizes its valuation function, is then exactly the intersection of these two
boundaries (necessary and sufficient conditions, by construction).
4 Numerical set-up
4.1 Viability Algorithm
The set of constraints K and the target Ω are defined by inequalities:
K ∪ Ω =: {ξ(z) ≤ 0}. (20)
A viable state satisfies:
Infz(.)∈S(z)Supt∈[0,T ]ξ(z(t)) ≤ 0 (21)
Bonneuil (2006) uses stochastic optimization to solve (21). The state z is
viable if and only if at least one solution z(.) with z(0) = z exists. Instead of
trying z at random, a search for a viable z is done by traveling in the state space
with a probability of decreasing the cost Infz(.)∈S(z)Supt∈[0,T ]ξ(z(t)) over z, until
this cost ever becomes non positive. This probability increases with the total
number of trials. The search for z is proceeded by stochastic optimization, too.
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With the addition of the auxiliary variables y(1), y(2), and time t now con-
sidered as a state variable in the augmented dynamic, the search for a viable
optimum for population 1 consists in first finding a viable state (x, y
(1)
0 , y
(2)
0 ),
then increasing y
(1)
0 step by step at x and y
(2)
0 fixed until obtaining a non viable
state. Refinement yields y
(1)
0 on the boundary of the capture-viability kernel in
the direction of high y(1) of the viability kernel associated with the augmented dy-
namic (Bonneuil, 2012). There is no need to compute the whole capture-viability
kernel, which is very time-consuming. The same applies when seeking the viable
optimum for population 2.
4.2 Three representative cases
We consider three important cases, so as to understand the effect of produc-
tivity and nuisance differentials:
• case 1: the introduction of cleaner energy decreases the marginal contribu-
tion to pollution and the productivity of capital equally in both countries:
A
(1)
1 = A
(2)
1 = 1.5, A
(1)
2 = A
(2)
2 = 1.1, α
(1)
1 = α
(2)
1 = 0.05, α
(1)
2 = α
(2)
2 = 0.03;
• case 2: the introduction of cleaner energy decreases the productivity of
capital in both countries equally; it also decreases the marginal contribution
to pollution in both countries, but in country 2 more than in country 1:
A
(1)
1 = A
(2)
1 = 1.5, A
(1)
2 = 1.3, A
(2)
2 = 1.0, α
(1)
1 = α
(2)
1 = 0.05, α
(1)
2 = α
(2)
2 =
0.03;
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• case 3: the introduction of cleaner energy decreases the productivity of
capital in both countries, but in country 2 more than in country 1; it also
decreases the marginal contribution to pollution equally in both countries:
A
(1)
1 = A
(2)
1 = 1.5, A
(1)
2 = A
(2)
2 = 1.1, α
(1)
1 = α
(2)
1 = 0.05, α
(1)
2 = 0.03,
α
(2)
2 = 0.01.
We draw initial states (K
(1)
0 , K
(2)
0 , P0, y
(1)
0 , y
(2)
0 ) at random, test their viability
status by the viability algorithm, reject those tested not viable, until obtaining
300 viable states. For each of them, a one-dimensional optimization yields the
highest value of y
(1)
0 (at y
(2)
0 fixed). These points belong to the upper boundary in
the direction of high y(1) of the capture viability kernel Capt{2,3,18}(K × R3,K ×
{T, 0, 0}). We approximate this manifold by penalized least squares on the basis
of the regular grid {0, 0.1, · · · , 1.0}3 of the cube (K(1)0 , K(2)0 , P0) scaled to [0, 1]3.
Similarly, we obtain 300 points (K
(1)
0 , K
(2)
0 , P0, y
(1)
0 , y
(2)
0 ) viable in K×R2 and
for which the valuation function y
(2)
0 is maximal. These points likewise delineate
a manifold numerically approximated by penalized least squares.
The smoothed manifold built from the 300 scattered points obtained on each
upper boundary must be truncated so as to retain only the states for which
(K
(1)
0 , K
(2)
0 , P0) is viable for {2, 3}. To do this, we smooth the viability kernel of
problem {2, 3} by penalized least squares, successively P0 as a function of K(1)0
and K
(2)
0 , then K
(1)
0 as a function of K
(2)
0 and P , and finally K
(2)
0 as a function of
K
(1)
0 and P0. The computation of one viable state x with its two optima y
(1)
0 and
15
y
(2)
0 requires 11 computing hours on a Dell Precision M6600, or 137 computing
days for the 2× 300 points.
4.3 Nash equilibria
From the two truncated smoothed manifolds representing the two upper bound-
aries of Capt{2,3,18}(K × R3,K × {T, 0, 0}) in the direction of either y(1) or y(2),
we compute the intersection of the two surfaces of viable optima. This inter-
section is the locus of viable Nash equilibria. Figure 1 shows an example of a
section at given P0. The switching times t1 and t2, as well as the mean values of
consumption C(j)t<tj and C
(j)
t≥tj , j = 1, 2, associated with these Nash equilibria
likewise are obtained by penalized least squares from the values associated with
the computed viable optima.
The valuation functions at viable Nash equilibria and their associated switch-
ing times and mean consumption values all depend only on the initial conditions
K
(1)
0 , K
(2)
0 , and P0 through the maximization (14). Therefore, in order to charac-
terize Nash equilibria, we cannot take switching times or consumption levels as
explanatory variables in regressions. These control variables are endogenous, and
are entirely determined by the initial conditions K
(1)
0 , K
(2)
0 , and P0. That is why
we characterize the viable Nash equilibria in regressing the valuation function
and its controls in a system of seemingly unrelated regressions having only these
initial conditions as explanatory variables. The three systems, one for each case,
16
y0
0
1
K(1)
1
1
0
K(2)0
y(1)0
y(2)0
Figure 1: Section at P0 = 0.1 (for P0 normalized between 0 and 1) of the Nash
equilibria as intersection of the boundaries in the direction of high y(j), j =
1, 2, of the two capture-viability kernels. Coordinates scaled between 0 (minimal
computed value) and 1 (maximal computed value). Parameter values: ρ = 0.05,
ν = 0.5, δK = 0.1, δP = 0.1.
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are embedded in a single model, to allow testable comparisons (with τ denoting
transposition):
Y =
3∑
i=1
BτX1case i (22)
where Y τ = (y, t1, t2, C(1)t<t1 , C
(2)
t<t2 , C
(1)
t≥t1 , C(2)t≥t2) is the vector made of the
valuation function at the Nash equilibrium, the associated switching times, and
the mean consumption values. The explanatory variables areXτ = (1, K
(1)
0 , K
(2)
0 , P0),
B is a matrix of coefficients, and 1case i is the indicator of case i = 1, 2, 3.
The valuation function at viable Nash equilibria y, capital values K
(1)
0 and
K
(2)
0 , pollution level P0, and consumption levels are re-scaled between 0 and 1
within their ranges of variation. Significant coefficients at 5% are indicated by
a star; standard deviations appear in parentheses below the coefficients. We
present the three cases successively, although they are estimated jointly in (22).
• Case 1 (after technological switch, both countries are of equal productivity
and contribute equally to pollution)
E(y) = 0.67
(0.01)
∗ + 0.20
(0.02)
∗ K(1)0 + 0.20
(0.02)
∗ K(2)0 − 0.10
(0.01)
∗ P0
E(t1) = 13.23
(0.21)
∗ + 5.70
(0.45)
∗ K(1)0 + 0.95
(0.45)
∗ K(2)0 + 1.23
(0.29)
∗ P0
E(t2) = 12.87
(0.17)
∗ + 1.01
(0.36)
∗ K(1)0 + 5.81
(0.36)
∗ K(2)0 + 1.71
(0.23)
∗ P0
E(C(1)t<t1) = 0.16
(0.019)
∗ + 0.12
(0.041)
∗ K(1)0 + 0.38
(0.04)
∗ K(2)0 + 0.013
(0.026)
P0
E(C(2)t<t2) = 0.11
(0.02)
∗ + 0.41
(0.04)
∗ K(1)0 + 0.14
(0.04)
∗ K(2)0 − 0.010
(0.022)
P0
E(C(1)t≥t1) = 0.30
(0.02)
∗ − 0.22
(0.04)
∗ K(1)0 + 0.34
(0.04)
∗ K(2)0 − 0.001
(0.025)
P0
E(C(2)t≥t2) = 0.25
(0.02)
∗ + 0.35
(0.04)
∗ K(1)0 − 0.19
(0.04)
∗ K(2)0 − 0.008
(0.024)
P0,
(23)
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where E denotes expectancy. As expected, because the two countries have
the same parameters, the coefficients of K
(1)
0 and K
(2)
0 are not significantly
different from each other. The higher the pollution level at the start, the
lower the maximal valuation function. The higher the initial capital value,
the higher the consumption level in the same country before the switching
and the lower the consumption level thereafter: people consume more when
their production capacity is higher. Expecting that the other country’s
inhabitants are doing the same, they increase consumption, while the higher
the other country’s initial capital, the more they delay their transition to
the less polluting technology.
The higher the initial capital value, the more each country consumes before
switching and the longer it delays switching, while reducing its consumption
after switching. Combining the equations for consumption and timing, the
mean consumption over the entire period [0, T ] increases with the initial
capital values of both countries.
The Nash equilibria then reflect a race to consume more when the other
participant is also expected to consume more. Logically, a longer time to
switching is associated with more pollution, that is, with a higher initial
pollution level.
• Case 2 (after technological switch, Country 2’s productivity is less than
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Country 1’s)
E(y) = 0.70
(0.01)
+ 0.23
(0.02)
∗ K(1)0 + 0.030
(0.005)
∗ K(2)0 − 0.10
(0.01)
∗ P0
E(t1) = 23.71
(0.98)
∗ − 23.89
(2.18)
∗ K(1)0 − 1.97
(0.47)
∗ K(2)0 − 5.23
(0.45)
∗ P0
E(t2) = 16.51
(0.33)
∗ + 12.51
(0.73)
∗ K(1)0 − 9.96
(0.16)
∗ K(2)0 − 7.08
(0.15)
∗ P0
E(C(1)t<t1) = 0.18
(0.01)
∗ + 0.56
(0.01)
∗ K(1)0 − 0.031
(0.001)
∗ K(2)0 − 0.030
(0.001)
∗ P0
E(C(2)t<t2) = 0.24
(0.01)
∗ − 0.05
(0.01)
∗ K(1)0 + 0.46
(0.01)
∗ K(2)0 − 0.04
(0.01)
∗ P0
E(C(1)t≥t1) = 0.28
(0.01)
∗ + 0.21
(0.01)
∗ K(1)0 + 0.07
(0.01)
∗ K(2)0 − 0.012
(0.001)
∗ P0
E(C(2)t≥t2) = 0.32
(0.01)
∗ − 0.04
(0.01)
∗ K(1)0 + 0.11
(0.01)
∗ K(2)0 − 0.08
(0.01)
∗ P0.
(24)
The asymmetry of productivity after the transition has modified the direc-
tions of association in switching times and initial capital values. The lower
productivity of Country 2 makes Country 1 leader of the game: the valu-
ation function depends mainly on consumption in Country 1, then on its
initial capital endowment K
(1)
0 (coefficient 0.23 in the expression of E(y)),
because Country 2’s capital grows more slowly. Pollution then comes mainly
from Country 1, whose capital grows faster after switching.
To compensate, the higher K
(1)
0 (coefficient -23.89 in the expression of
E(t1)), the earlier Country 1 switches. Meanwhile, Country 2 consumes
with respect to its capital capacities allowed by its initial capital K
(2)
0 (co-
efficients 0.46 in E(C(2)t<t2) and 0.11 in E(C
(2)
t≥t2)), but, to keep up with
Country 1, delays switching all the more as K
(1)
0 is high (coefficient 12.51
in E(t2)), and continues using the more polluting technology as long as
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possible. However, delaying because of country 1’s higher productivity is
possible comes at the price of reduced consumption (coefficients -0.05 and
-0.04 in E(C(2)t≥t2)). The differential in productivity encourages the more
productive country to switch earlier and the less productive country to switch
later than they would do in the absence of a differential.
More pollution in any case triggers earlier technological switching (coeffi-
cients -5.23 in E(t1) and -7.08 in E(t2)), and limits consumption (coeffi-
cients -0.030 inE(C(1)t<t1), -0.04 in E(C
(2)
t<t2), -0.012 in E(C
(1)
t≥t1), -0.08
in E(C(2)t≥t2)).
The higher the initial capital value K
(1)
0 , the more Country 1 consumes
before and after switching (coefficients 0.56 in E(C(1)t<t1) and 0.21 in
E(C(1)t≥t1)), but also the sooner the switch (coefficient -23.89 in E(t1)),
and the later for Country 2 (coefficient 12.51 in E(t2)). Country 1, expect-
ing Country 2 to switch to a less productive and less polluting technology, is
better off consuming when Country 2 pollutes less. Conversely, Country 2,
anticipating that Country 1 will use its advantage to hasten its switch, is
better off postponing its own switching as long as K
(1)
0 is high.
As a result, combining the equations of consumption and timing, the mean
consumption for each country over the entire period [0, T ] increases with
initial capital then decreases: “poor” countries consume less but for longer
with the more polluting technology; while “rich” countries consume more
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(and pollute more) but for a shorter period of time.
• Case 3 (after technological switch, Country 2 contributes less to total pol-
lution than Country 1)
E(y) = 0.60
(0.01)
∗ + 0.58
(0.04)
∗ K(1)0 + 0.04
(0.03)
K
(2)
0 − 0.05
(0.01)
∗ P0
E(t1) = 11.21
(0.06)
∗ + 7.13
(0.52)
∗ K(1)0 + 9.25
(0.37)
∗ K(2)0 − 0.78
(0.06)
∗ P0
E(t2) = 5.73
(0.02)
∗ − 1.16
(0.17)
∗ K(1)0 − 3.99
(0.12)
∗ K(2)0 − 0.67
(0.02)
∗ P0
E(C(1)t<t1) = 0.15
(0.01)
∗ + 0.67
(0.01)
∗ K(1)0 + 0.02
(0.01)
∗ K(2)0 − 0.03
(0.01)
∗ P0
E(C(2)t<t2) = − 0.03
(0.01)
∗ + 0.58
(0.07)
∗ K(1)0 + 0.32
(0.05)
∗ K(2)0 − 0.13
(0.01)
∗ P0
E(C(1)t≥t1) = 0.32
(0.01)
∗ + 0.09
(0.04)
∗ K(1)0 − 0.14
(0.03)
∗ K(2)0 + 0.09
(0.01)
∗ P0
E(C(2)t≥t2) = 0.14
(0.01)
∗ + 0.10
(0.01)
∗ K(1)0 + 0.21
(0.01)
∗ K(2)0 − 0.013
(0.001)
∗ P0.
(25)
The valuation again depends mainly (coefficient 0.58 in E(C(2)t<t2)) on the coun-
try contributing most to pollution, which is also the country that waits longer to
switch, the higher the initial capital values (coefficients 7.13 and 9.25 in E(t1)).
This is because Country 1 has to produce longer under the more polluting regime
to attain the same cumulative discounted utility as Country 2, whose utility is
less penalized by pollution. At the Nash equilibrium, to obtain the same utility,
the country with the higher pollution penalty after the transition remains as long
as possible in the more productive regime. This strategy is more polluting, and
consequently detrimental to Country 2. This continues to the point that in Coun-
try 1, higher consumption means more pollution (coefficients 0.03 in E(C(1)t<t1)
and 0.09 in E(C(1)t≥t1)).
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Meanwhile, expecting this behavior, Country 2’s best strategy is to switch
early so as to limit the pollution level, a behavior which is favorable to Coun-
try 1. More pollution entails less consumption (coefficients -0.13 in E(C(2)t<t2)
and -0.013 in E(C(2)t≥t2)). The Nash equilibrium is cynical in that the polluter
is encouraged to pollute by the other player, who is cleaner. Anticipating this,
Country 2 consumes (and pollutes) all the more, the higher the initial capital
values Country 1 starts from. Non cooperation has the effect that reducing one’s
contribution results in more total consumption and more total pollution,. Coun-
try 2, which gains utility by polluting less after the switch, is better off hastening
this transition when both initial capital values are high.
The mean consumption over the entire period [0, T ] increases for both coun-
tries, as in the symmetric case.
Numerically, consumption levels C(1) and C(2) of countries 1 and 2, which are
controls of the problem {1, 2, 3}, do not look bang bang. To confirm, we ran the
optimization procedure from identical 100 initial values of the state variables,
by admitting only extreme values minC(j) and maxC(j) for the controls C(j),
j = 1, 2. For each of these 100 initial points, we find smaller optimal values y(1)
and y(2) with bang-bang controls than with control variables C(j) admissible in
[minC(j),maxC(j)].
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5 Conclusion
Taking Nash equilibria as located at the intersection of the two boundaries of
the capture viability kernels in the directions of high y(1) and high y(2) allows us to
compute Nash equilibria without resorting to simplifying endogenous assumptions
on the controls, to take state constraints into account, to deal with non linearity,
and to avoid the round-about method based on solving differential equations.
This is an opportunity opened conjointly by the concept of capture-viability, by
Bonneuil’s (2012) theorem on the location of viable optima, and by Bonneuil’s
(2006) viability algorithm in large state dimension.
By examining three games: the symmetric case, the case where one country
is less productive after switching to less polluting technology, and the case where
one country contributes less to pollution after switching, we highlighted the inter-
dependence of the two countries at the Nash equilibrium, again without having
postulated any endogenous mechanism, as is often done. The model and the
examined cases allow us to predict the conditions for technological switching: we
showed that the absence of cooperation leads to undesirable consequences, where
efforts to pollute less motivate the other country to pollute more, or encourage
the country that will be cleaner or less productive after switching, to delay its
transition.
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